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In this essay I explore what might be meant by the “nearest things” in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. In the first part of the essay I contextualise Nietzsche’s concerns with “the 
closest things of all” in the “free spirit” period (1878-1882) and raise the question of how 
knowledge of them is possible. This idea is developed in the second part of the paper in 
relation to the claim that dominant (Platonic/Christian) habits of thought impede our 
understanding of the body. In the third section, I suggest that Nietzsche’s interest in 
Epicurean thinking in this period enables us to situate the nearest things within the political 
aesthetics of a transfigured physis. In the final section, I examine how Nietzsche’s 1881 notes 
on eternal return provide a less-well known locus for his philosophy of the nearest things, one 
which suggests that to “incorporate” eternal return we need to become “good neighbours” to 











The Wanderer’s Promise: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the “Nearest Things” 
 
No wanderer lived so close to his shadow as Nietzsche lived to his. Half-blind and 
gripped by crushing pressure inside his skull, Nietzsche picked his way through the Alpine 
landscape, alert to what his afflictions progressively revealed: a nethermost existence, 
difficult to reach but close by and with which communication is possible. The “air of the 
heights” that pervades his writing does not bequeath lofty abstractions of a supersensible 
vocation but the breath of the outside, the stirring of unguessed-at things.  
Philosophy as I have understood it and lived so far, is choosing to live in ice and high 
mountains – seeking out everything alien and questionable in existence, everything 
that previously has been exiled by morality. (EH, “Foreword,” 3).i  
Philosophy which is “lived” in this way approaches the dark places of thought, the shadows 
from which concepts emerge and ideas come to be. In the winter of 1879, at the nadir of his 
vitality and scarcely able to see three steps ahead of him, Nietzsche produced The Wanderer 
and his Shadow, a text framed by a discussion of things hitherto muted and poorly perceived. 
At the close of this text, the shadow declares to the wanderer: “Of all that you have put 
forward, nothing has pleased me more than a promise you have made: You want again to 
become a good neighbour to the things nearest to you. This will benefit us poor shadows 
too”. It is uncertain how to read the wanderer’s promise. The strange imperative that small 
and everyday matters should claim philosophical attention is repeatedly emphasized in 
Nietzsche’s middle writings but the question of how to think them is never explicitly 
developed and it is not until his final work that the topic once again achieves prominence. 
Indeed, it is startling that Ecce Homo, the work in which Nietzsche announces the 
future association of his name with a “crisis as yet unprecedented on earth,” should be replete 
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with recommendations pertaining to “little things” such as the benefits of drinking cocoa in 
displeasing weather or the baneful effects of German pastry on the “will to life” (EH, 
“Clever,” 1). Few writers have such skill for combining the apocalyptic with domestic advice. 
Whilst such commonplace musings might appear ancillary to the commanding themes of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy - such as grand politics, revaluation of all values, and the 
thoroughgoing critique of Christian morality – Nietzsche leaves the reader in no doubt about 
the earnestness of his pronouncements. It is the “little things” such as “nutriment, place, 
climate, recreation” – traditionally regarded as matters of indifference – which Nietzsche 
contends are “beyond all conception of greater importance than anything that has been 
considered of importance hitherto” (EH, “Clever,” 10). It is precisely here that one has to 
begin to relearn. The things that have received greatest deliberation – concepts such as God, 
soul, virtue, sin, the Beyond, truth, eternal life, are mere fancies, “strictly speaking, lies 
issuing from the bad instincts of the sick, from pernicious [schädlich] natures in the deepest 
sense” (ibid.).  
All questions of politics, the ordering of society, education have been falsified down 
to their foundations because the most harmful [schädlich] people have been taken for 
great people – because one learnt to despise the little things, which means the 
fundamental concerns of life itself. (EH, “Clever,” 10) 
Nietzsche returns to this point most urgently as Ecce Homo draws to a close, asserting that 
Christian morality teaches that matters such as nourishment, dwelling place, spiritual diet, the 
treatment of the sick, cleanliness, weather are of negligible significance compared to the 
spirit and the immortal soul (EH, “Destiny”, 8). As the question “Have I been understood?” 
echoes through the final pages with a ringing note of futility, Nietzsche declares the holy 
pretext of “improving” humanity “a ruse to drain dry life itself” whilst the concept sin and its 
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torture instrument, the concept of free will, have confused the instincts to the point at which 
“mistrust of the instincts” has become second nature (Ibid.). 
With the body having learnt to misread its own judgements, Nietzsche makes an ardent 
appeal on behalf of the senses and all things of the shadows. In what follows, I explore what 
might be meant by the “nearest things” and how to think them in Nietzsche’s philosophy. In 
the first part of the essay I contextualize Nietzsche’s concerns with “the closest things of all” 
in the “free spirit” period (1878-1882) and raise the question of how knowledge of them is 
possible. This idea is developed in the second part of the paper in relation to dominant 
(Platonic-Christian) habits of thought and is elaborated in the third in connection with 
Epicurus and the political aesthetics of a transfigured physis. In the final section, I show how 
Nietzsche’s 1881 notes on eternal return provide a less-well known locus for his philosophy 
of the nearest things, one which suggests that to “incorporate” eternal return we need to 
become “good neighbours” to what is close.  
 
i) The Nearest Things 
 
Nietzsche’s ailing body and his pursuit of the optimum conditions for its relief, form a 
constant chronicle in his letters to friends throughout his philosophical career. As Gregory 
Moore has shown, Nietzsche was typical of many nineteenth century intellectuals in that he 
experimented with various dietary regimens, read copious popular volumes of the day on 
diet, health and hygiene, freely self-medicated and enthusiastically practiced indoor 
gymnastics.ii Insights from these idiosyncratic researches find their way into Nietzsche’s 
philosophy at every turn. It would be precipitate, though, to assume that his various allusions 
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to the “nearest things” in his writings constitute the philosophical study for which he urgently 
calls. In The Gay Science he acknowledges the “immense field of work” involved in 
embarking on an investigation of all that has “given colour to existence”; of generating a 
history of the affects; of conducting research on the consequences of a regular schedule of 
work, festivals and recreation; of preparing a philosophy of nutrition; of observing how 
differently the human drives have grown and could grow depending on moral climate (GS, 
7). It would be tempting to assume that a little more labour in the laboratories of human 
culture is all that is required to redress this deficit in our knowledge. However, since the little 
things have been “despised,” not simply overlooked, it is important to begin with the question 
of value. 
Nietzsche’s first references to the nearest things in his published work are to be found 
in the early sections of The Wanderer and his Shadow, where the idea is most fully 
developed. According to Nietzsche we have been schooled to abhor “the present and 
neighbourhood and life” because we have dwelled too long in fog and gloomy weather, 
gazing languidly at worlds beyond our own (WS 16). Even the few who have dwelt in the 
“brighter fields of nature and spirit” have inherited “in their blood some of this poison of 
contempt for the nearest things” (Ibid.). Such an assertion is significant because it implies 
that our ability to incorporate new values is impeded by our history, by what we have 
“become”. This toxic husbandry of the human animal is the work of the “improvers of 
mankind” whom Nietzsche insists “lie like a burden on society” (WS 5). In section five of 
The Wanderer and his Shadow entitled “Linguistic usage and reality” [Sprachgebrauch und 
Wirklichkeit] Nietzsche asserts that the human being needs to be protected against the priests 
and metaphysicians with their vast array of gloomy fictions, of souls and enduring subjects, 
of moral conscience, guilt and punishment. Here he repudiates the suggestion that it is only 
with reluctance that the human pampers its animal urges: “For instance, we say ‘we only eat 
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to live’—an abominable lie, like that which speaks of the procreation of children as the real 
purpose of all sexual pleasure” (WS 5). To see the nearest things as matters of mere 
biological exigency is to operate with a wholly impoverished model of the “functional” body, 
as if everything reduces to the dumb sating of a predictable beast. Nietzsche bemoans the fact 
that because the ascetic preachers and moral educators have ritualized insincerity and 
hypocrisy towards quotidian matters, things like eating, clothing and housing are never 
considered worthy of a “constant unprejudiced and universal reflection and reform,” (WS 5); 
indeed, these affairs are counted as degrading and unworthy of serious intellectual and artistic 
consideration. Only “the most serious,” farthest things, are held in high esteem. As a 
consequence, “almost all the physical and psychical frailties of the individual” stem from the 
failure to attend to the “nearest things” (WS 6). According to Nietzsche, continual offences 
against the most elementary laws of the body and spirit derive from being “unknowledgeable 
in the smallest and most everyday things” (WS 6).  
In a twenty-first century, western, and broadly secular context, the power of the 
“farthest things” has receded somewhat; indeed, Nietzsche’s appeal to the nearest things may 
now seem to accord with a prevailing materialistic outlook. As Adrian del Caro remarks: 
“The common sense with which the closest things are affirmed speaks for itself. What is real 
is what is close, verifiable, and an individual should be able to make her own determinations 
on the degree of closeness of all things.”iii However, Nietzsche leaves the reader in no doubt 
that blunders against the most basic physiological principles stem from a sustained over 
valorisation of the farthest things and a concomitant failure to give the nearest things their 
due. The human animal has been bred to devalue what is near. As if to underscore this point, 
the examples that Nietzsche gives of the nearest things in section six of The Wanderer and 
his Shadow entitled “Earthly frailty and its chief cause” are designed to unsettle our 
complacency about what is merely “given”. Nietzsche remarks, almost with a sense of 
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indignation, that “if we look about us, we are always coming across men who have eaten eggs 
all their lives without observing that the longest ones taste the best”; further, there are those 
who do not know that a “thunder-storm is beneficial to the stomach” or that “perfumes are 
most fragrant in cold, clear air”; that our “sense of taste varies in different parts of our 
mouths”; that “every meal at which we talk well or listen well does harm to the digestion” 
(WS 6). These latter are presented as examples of our defective powers of observation and, 
even if these specific cases do not seem to clinch the point, Nietzsche says that we should 
“concede all the more readily that everyday matters are very imperfectly seen and rarely 
observed by the majority” (WS 6).  
There are two points to be made about these very curious examples. First, Nietzsche 
appears to have deliberately selected illustrations of phenomena which are as trivial as 
possible. It is not clear how failure to notice these kinds of things could have any broader 
social significance or result in the “earthly frailty” of the title. Second, some of these 
examples are of dubious validity, if not entirely bogus. Are there really such things as long 
eggs? And if there are, do we constantly come across egg-eaters uninitiated into the delights 
of the longer kind? This is not quite the kind of “verifiable” common sense that “speaks for 
itself”.iv One is tempted to pass over the examples and move straight to the conclusion as 
Robert Miner does when he says that “the oddity of these examples should not be allowed to 
obscure the main point” which is that almost all physical and psychological frailties derive 
from this deficient power of observation.v There is a nagging doubt, though, that in 
disregarding these specimen cases we are perpetuating the very neglect of the small things 
that is everywhere at issue; in haste to reduce the specific to the general, the nearest things are 
missed. Perhaps this is the greatest problem. When called upon to consider our small, 
seemingly inconsequential habits we call upon our habits of thinking to do so. 
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Advancing from the particular detail to the overall conclusion is such a dominant 
impulse of thought that it is triggered almost without hesitation. A second, related, reflex is 
the impetus to reduce the strange to the familiar, to assimilate the new to existing models of 
knowledge. For example, Julian Young’s response to these unusual examples is to assert that 
“since the ‘nearest things’ pertain to diet and health, it is likely that Nietzsche is influenced, 
here, by nineteenth century German materialism (which he knew from his 1866 reading of 
Friedrich Lange’s History of Materialism)”.vi Young adds that “the spirit of German 
materialism is summed up in Feuerbach’s famous remark that ‘man is what he eats’: more 
fully, ‘If you want to improve people then give them better food instead of declamations 
against sin. Man is what he eats.’” (Ibid.). Were it not for the decidedly libertine tenor of 
Nietzsche’s claims about the discerning taste buds and aesthetic sensibilities, this 
interpretation would have some force. However, whilst the link to Feuerbach seems a logical 
one at the level of generalities, Nietzsche’s examples – fine-grained differences of palate, 
metabolism, olfactory sense – do not obviously exemplify Feuerbach’s socio-economic 
argument. 
We might readily grant that a materialist position of some kind is being advanced were it 
not for the eccentric nature of Nietzsche’s chosen examples. In a footnote to his commentary 
on this particular piece of text Adrian del Caro admits that Nietzsche “does, after all, sound 
rather superstitious in parts of this passage” vii (my emphasis). The comment is made in the 
course of del Caro’s condoning of an error made by R. J. Hollingdale in his mistranslation of 
“Stellen des Mundes” (places in the mouth) as “phases of the moon”. The Cambridge 
University English translation of section six of The Wanderer and his Shadow reads: “our 
sense of taste differs with differing phases of the moon” instead of “our sense of taste varies 
in different parts of our mouths”. In his footnote del Caro tacitly reveals what he resists 
professing in the main body of his work: that he finds the examples baffling. In this regard, 
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Hollingdale’s error can be seen as a telling one. The claim that the vagaries of the taste buds 
are cosmically related to the orbit of the moon is no less incredible than the assertion that 
extreme meteorological disturbance is good for the bowels. After all, Nietzsche is not averse 
to outlandish declarations (for example, his claim to be able to read off the effects that 
climate and weather conditions have on him as if he were a “very fined calibrated and reliable 
barometer,” EH, “Clever,” 2). Indeed, Hollingdale’s mistake in translation reveals a superior 
appreciation of the fact that Nietzsche’s examples are of a peculiarly distinctive kind. Whilst 
fanciful, they are not so fraudulent that they are self-evidently false or entirely implausible. 
Like something from Kafka or Borges, they inhabit the twilight of the reader’s credulity, 
provoking reflection about things that may have been experienced many times yet have 
remained un-thought.  Claims of this kind frustrate lazy assent to their probable validity. In 
trying to make sense of these examples we become stranded in a kind of unknowing. Are we 
remiss in failing to notice these particular things or in believing them to be true? What would 
have to be in place in order for us to have faith in this kind of knowledge? When it comes to 
the nearest things we are compelled to concede how unknown to ourselves we knowers are. 
The great unknowns are not out there in the ether but are right beside us like our shadows. 
 
ii) Habits of Thought 
So close that we cannot see them, the nearest things in Nietzsche’s philosophy are less 
easy to appreciate than we might have supposed. As Babette E. Babich has noted, we are 
poorly placed to question the nature of our “nature,” even if we were inclined to do so: “We 
cannot jump over our own shadow: we cannot get behind our own skin, behind ourselves, 
because of all the nearest and closest things that as Heidegger points out are distant from us 
due precisely to such proximity, what we are is most alien to us.”viii Against the metaphysical 
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tradition, Nietzsche understands thought as a bodily process, something which depends upon 
a conducive environment in which it can develop. The problem is that the nearest things have 
already been thought philosophically and politically insofar as they have been dismissed as 
unworthy of our consideration and “exiled” by morality. These negative judgements have 
been so thoroughly embodied that they have become instinctive (“strictly speaking, lies 
issuing from the bad instincts of the sick, from pernicious natures in the deepest sense” (EH, 
“Clever,” 10)). This has far reaching implications for the intellectual habits which we draw 
on when trying to access them anew. How can we become good neighbours (again) to those 
we have exiled? 
Let us recall that The Wanderer and his Shadow 5 in which the notion of the closest or 
nearest things is first introduced is entitled “Linguistic usage and reality”. Nietzsche’s 
argument is that faith in the “farthest things” is reinforced by a disingenuous and hyperbolic 
linguistic practice, the consequence being that we have no means to articulate or to value the 
things that are near. Here Nietzsche is picking up on the idea of “First and Last Things” with 
which the first volume of Human all too Human opens. Metaphysical philosophy, with its 
fundamental faith in antithetical values, denies that something could originate in its opposite 
(HH, 1). Supported by the transcendental presupposition that binary opposition is a logical 
constraint of thought, the “ultimate things” are said to have a wholly other origin from those 
base, material things: they claim a “miraculous source” in the very kernel of being. Rejecting 
these customary exaggerations of language, Nietzsche declares that there are no antitheses, 
only “sublimations” or deviations from a “basic element” [Grundelement]; that the most 
highly prized ideas and glorious things have inglorious origins in the “most despised 
materials,” that fine things are forged in the filthy crucible of matter (HH, 1).ix By definition, 
abstract ideas are absolutely other to the base materiality that they abject but the difference 
between the two “realms” is non-reciprocal. For Nietzsche, matter is a field of differential 
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forces within which opposition is already immanent. As he establishes in “On Truth and Lies 
in a Non-moral Sense,” the concept of identity, indeed concept formation as such, is achieved 
by denying both intrinsic continuity with matter and gradations of difference (his example 
being the countless non-identical leaves reduced to equivalence by the concept “leaf”). As 
distributed capacities immanent to the flows of matter the nearest things are stubbornly 
resistant to specification by concepts. At the level of “linguistic usage,” their reality 
disappears. 
From the perspective of Platonic-Christian values, the “nearest”  and “farthest things”  are 
fundamentally different in kind, the latter having been prized as ideal forms, ungrounded in 
matter and wholly distinct from active processes of materialization. Because these realms 
have been regarded as mutually discontinuous, the world is perceived as a mass of isolated 
beings, unitary souls and brute material forms with no fluency between them. If the reason 
we fail to think the nearest things is that we approach them in terms of the farthest things –
concepts, truth, grand narratives of knowledge of reason or science – then ignorance in 
physiological matters will not be swiftly corrected by knowledge. Nietzsche’s strange 
examples in section six of The Wanderer and his Shadow are about very fine gradations of 
difference and subtleties of sense that elude both common experience and the conventional 
registers in which we aim to “make sense” of them. To try and apprehend sensations or 
experiences in these terms is to arrest them, to imprison them in habits of thought and 
language which confiscate their powers. To become good neighbours to the nearest things we 
need to jettison our ingrained habits of thinking about the body and find a way of enabling 
the body to think. 
As Tracy B. Strong reminds us, “Nietzsche’s umgedrehter Platonismus is not to be 
understood as the valuation of the ‘natural’ as opposed to that of the supersensuous”.x The 
fundamentally oppositional character of Platonic thinking cannot be overcome through mere 
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opposition to it. To affirm the nearest things as the hitherto devalued contrary of the farthest 
things is a gesture which merely reinforces oppositional logic. As Eric Blondel notes, 
Nietzsche’s assertion that the “little things” are beyond all conception of greater importance 
than anything that has been considered of importance in the past is too easily misinterpreted 
as “the obscurantist promotion of unthought, ‘lived experience’”.xi  As Blondel goes on to 
say, the latter is often “just as ‘ideal’ and ideological as its opposite”.xii  Furthermore, as 
Strong points out, it is in the nature of the world as we experience it to be “known” but this 
knowledge is wholly dependent on  our embodied perspective.xiii To think the nearest things 
in Nietzsche’s philosophy an immanent mode of evaluating them must be found that does not 
devalue them in the name of higher values. 
At stake is a contestation of the sensible.xiv Attractive though it might be to perceive the 
body as a cipher for the self, with the nearest things as a map of its essential coordinates, this 
cartography of the body is still conditioned by Platonic-Christian values. The “resolution” to 
our alienation from the nearest things must be that we become more estranged from our 
coherent sense of self. In articulating his philosophy of the body, Nietzsche departs from the 
vocabulary of individual agency and emphasizes the inestimable value of non-knowledge.  In 
a well-known note in The Will to Power, he describes “the nature of our subject-unity” in 
terms of “regents at the head of a communality,” going on to identify the dependence of these 
regents upon the ruled, and also “an order of rank and division of labour as the conditions that 
make possible the whole and its individual parts” (KSA 11, 40 [21], p. 638). As Foucault will 
later thematize in The History of Sexuality, “power must be understood in the first instance as 
the  multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organization” (92). Although the ruler and the subordinates are “of the 
same kind,” it is often necessary for the regent to be kept in considerable ignorance 
concerning individual activities and disturbances within the communality (KSA 11, 40 [21], 
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p. 639). As Christa Davis Acampora has reminded us, there is a political character to the 
organization of bodily drives and “this allows us to consider what rules, how it rules, and how 
it came to rule”.xv Nietzsche’s provocations about our knowledge of the nearest things in 
‘Earthly frailty and its chief cause’ (WS 6) reveals the dominance of a Platonic metaphysical 
body politics governed by consciousness and its “sharpened senses”:  
This is why we question the body and reject the evidence of the sharpened senses 
[verschärften Sinne]; we see, if you like, whether the inferior parts [Untergebenen] 
themselves cannot enter into communication with us. (KSA 11, 40 [21], p. 639)  
To enable this subdued and subordinated body to emerge from the shadows, a different 
physiological organization must be found, one which will remedy the woes of our earthly 
debility.xvi 
 
iii Epicurean Wisdom 
Although Nietzsche gives few clues as to how the nearest things are to be thought in 
the scattered references in his “free spirit” writings, in a note from summer 1879, there is a 
suggestion that a more sustained discussion of the idea as a “doctrine” was envisaged (KSA 
8, 40 [16], p.581). Under the projected title “The Doctrine of the Nearest Things” Nietzsche 
offers a list of familiar concerns: “Division of the day [..], food, company, nature, solitude, 
sleep, employment, education (original and foreign)”, the intriguing “use of mood and 
atmospheric conditions,” and at the close of the list “retreat from politics”. The phrase 
Zurückgezogenheit von der Politik – privacy from/ withdrawal from politics is intriguing 
because it seems more of a decision than a category, a stance to be taken rather than another 
topic as such. One wonders why the doctrine of the nearest things might include this 
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instruction. However, as scholars of classics will recognize, the dictum “retreat from politics” 
has a distinctly Epicurean resonance; in fact, the injunction “We must release ourselves from 
the prison of [routine] affairs and politics” (ἐκλυτέον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ 
πολιτικὰ δεσμωτηρίου) is one of the best known Vatican sayings of the ancient Greek 
philosopher (LVIII).xvii Political life and the daily duties incumbent on those in public office 
were actively shunned by Epicurus and in this respect his philosophical practice was 
markedly at odds with the Platonic school. In this connection, the first item on Nietzsche’s 
list is also worthy of comment. “Division of the day” is boldly emphasized at the top of the 
inventory, potentially because it is the condition for several others things (for example, work, 
sleep, and recreation have to be balanced against each other in the “twenty-four hours of the 
day” (WS 6)) but most importantly it is related to the issue of routine. Given the negative 
impact that a “prescribed schedule” [vorgeschriebene Zeiteintheilung] can impose upon 
philosophical thought (D 500) it is imperative that the organisation of the little things is given 
by the body and not imposed from the outside. As Christa Davis Acamporaxviii has shown, an 
immanent process of organization is elaborated in Nietzsche’s reflections on how “an instinct 
for self-preservation issues its commandments” in relation to the little things (EH, “Clever”, 
8). Indeed, Nietzsche complains in Ecce Homo, “In my time at Basel, my entire spiritual diet, 
including my daily schedule [die Tages-Eintheilung], was a completely senseless misuse of 
extraordinary powers” (EH, “Clever,” 2). To take the little things seriously, it is imperative to 
find wisdom “within”. 
During the period spanning Human all too Human to The Gay Science, Epicurus appears 
on the periphery of Nietzsche’s philosophy, a shadow presence to his wanderings, a “wisdom 
that walks in bodily form” (AOM 224). Whilst at no point does Nietzsche explicitly identify 
Epicurus as an inspiration for the philosophy of the nearest things, the connections are 
everywhere implicit.xix For example, the two sections of The Wanderer and his Shadow (WS 
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5 & 6) which introduce the doctrine of the nearest things are directly succeeded by a lengthy 
passage on the consolations of Epicurean teaching. The “wonderful insight” which Nietzsche 
attributes to Epicurus is the realisation that to quell the tempests of the soul “it is absolutely 
not necessary to have resolved the ultimate and outermost theoretical questions” (WS 7). 
Faith in the notion of ultimate truth is undermined by Epicurus’s embrace of a “multiplicity 
of hypotheses” and by his insistence on the gods’ disregard for the affairs of mortals (WS 
7).xx At odds with the orthodoxies of transcendent thinking, Epicurus’s rejection of the public 
political life of the Athenian statesman is a move in a different political direction, a return to 
the nearest things. 
Indeed, the great lesson of Epicurus is to withdraw from the polis, to be relieved of 
citizenship, to “live unknown”. Away from the Academy and the Lyceum, both of which 
were subject to the scrutiny of the city, the Epicurean Garden was a place in which disciples 
became attuned to the rhythms of the natural world. Gardening activity was not merely an 
education in the cycles of nature, but for the disciples who cultivated the fruit and vegetables 
that were grown there, it was an immersion in the elemental: “Here, in the convergence of 
vital forces in the garden’s microcosm, the cosmos manifested its greatest harmonies; here 
the human soul rediscovered its essential connection to matter”.xxi For Robert Harrison, the 
most important political principle that tending the Epicurean garden yielded was that life in 
all its variations “is intrinsically mortal” and that “the human soul shares the fate of whatever 
grows and perishes on and in the earth”.xxii  For Nietzsche, as for Epicurus, the “nearest 
things” are flows, forces and drives: paths between realms that the Platonic-Christian 
worldview characterizes as essentially separate.  
As Gary Shapiro has commented, the “earth” in Nietzsche’s philosophy is “often taken in 
a general way to refer to embodied life”.xxiii A number of commentators including Graham 
Parkesxxiv and Robert Gooding-Williams,xxv have explored Zarathustra’s invocation to “stay 
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loyal to the earth” (Z, Prologue 3) as a sign of reverence for nature in its animal, vegetal and 
elemental dimensions (Parkes) and as the distinctive style of a culture (Gooding-Williams). 
Adrian del Caro has explicitly linked the “earth” to the nearest things: “Our earthiness 
(Erdhaftigkeit) is precisely the feature of human being that Nietzsche foregrounds when he 
alerts us to the presence of the closest things and the quotidian”.xxvi Shapiro proposes that 
Nietzsche’s most consistent name for an earth that is freed from the distortions of an “extra-
earthly world” is “garden”xxvii; indeed, his idea of earth as a garden “is an attempt to sketch a 
politics of the human-earth”.xxviii Noting Nietzsche’s “frequent invocation of Epicurus’ 
philosophical garden,” Shapiro comments that “the garden is not only a place of refuge but an 
incentive and possible model for thinking of the human-earth as a site of garden-
happiness”.xxix If the fundamental crime of Christian morality has been to breed an animal 
with instincts to mistrust its instincts, we need to reclaim the earth and to take the body and 
physiology as our starting point.  
The body with its sharpened senses is a polis ruled by despotic consciousness: self-
aware but only of its own borders. Following Epicurus, Nietzsche moves away from the body 
politic to the body of the earth. His “body” is not a walled city like the Platonic republic. 
Previously muffled by linguistic custom and cultural convention, the “inferior,” unknown 
body is now exposed in an uncanny silence.  
The human body [is that] on which the entire most distant and nearest [nächste] past 
of all organic becoming becomes alive and bodily again, through which, above and 
beyond which, an immense inaudible stream seems to flow. (KSA 11, 36 [35], p. 565) 
This is a body released from the grip of the coherent, self-regarding senses into the 
transpersonal silt of multiple flows. Wash away the foam and wrack of so many ego impulses 
and there is a quiet history yet to be explored. If the body is the living medium of all organic 
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becoming, it is far more than the physical entity of biological sciences. The point is not to 
reveal seeming empirical truths of “common sense” immediacy but to connect with the deep 
history of what is near. As Graham Parkes writes: “Whether we have any sense of history or 
not, there are multiple layers to our being, through which the past is continually flowing. 
Thus self-knowledge is not simply a matter of becoming acquainted with what plays upon the 
surface of our consciousness here and now.”xxx Parkes cites Nietzsche’s assertion that “the 
last three centuries very probably still continue to live on, in all their cultural colours and 
cultural reflections, close beside us: they want only to be discovered” (AOM, 223).xxxi 
Considered thus, Platonic-Christian abstractions are also immanent to this body (after all, 
they are cultural values that have been historically incorporated); however, they do not 
determine it and with close attention to the little things, they too can be overcome.  
 
iv   Becoming What One Is 
When Nietzsche asks in The Wanderer and his Shadow about matters of taste and 
diet, of fragrances and fresh air, the examples may seem trivial but they point us to an 
unknown body and a repertoire of senses that have been felt or encountered unthinkingly 
many times. Here Nietzsche endorses his allegiance with those who have loved the things of 
the earth and have pursued “an ever greater spiritualization and multiplication of the senses” 
(KSA 11, 37 [12], p.587). In pursuit of a sensory landscape beyond the confines of the 
Platonic body-politic, Nietzsche declares in Ecce Homo that it is on account of his fluctuating 
health that he develops a refinement of perception which an otherwise sound constitution 
would never have afforded (EH, “Wise,” 1). Elaborating further, he claims that illness grants 
him the energy to achieve “absolute isolation and release from routine circumstances” (EH, 
“Wise,” 2): “it was as if I discovered life anew, myself included; I tasted all good things, even 
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the small ones, as no other could easily taste them” (Ibid.). By taking the body as a guiding 
direction for thinking, Nietzsche turns his “will to health,” to life, into his philosophy (Ibid.). 
Importantly, the body emerges as the condition for thinking and not as the object of thought. 
As these remarks indicate, it is through the promptings of the nearest things that Nietzsche is 
able to “become what he is.”  
As Daniel Conway has observed, Nietzsche’s commitment to Epicurus is effectively 
renewed in Ecce Homo as he commends a way of life which “rehearses a number of familiar 
Epicurean themes,” including a “therapeutic attunement to the ‘little things’”.xxxii In Ecce 
Homo Nietzsche makes it clear that “becoming what one is” does not involve an active 
project on the part of the one who becomes. As Christa Davis Acampora points out, 
Nietzsche insists in Ecce Homo that with respect to the “little things” the wisdom of the body 
advances when consciousness recedes. xxxiii  Similarly, relearning is not about greater 
knowledge. Nietzsche’s recommendations for examining the little things are not to be taken 
as stipulations for particular diets or climates. He notes that everyone has his or her own 
measure, “often between the most narrow and the most delicate limits” (EH, “Clever”, 1). 
This essential point is summed up in a tantalizing fragment in Nietzsche’s notebook M III 1 
(dated Spring-Autumn 1881) thus: 
All habitualization [Gewöhnungen] (e.g. to specific foods, like coffee, or specific 
divisions of time [Zeiteintheilung] leads, in the long term, to the breeding of a 
particular kind of human. Therefore, take a look at yourself! Examine the smallest of 
things! Where do they tend? Do they belong to your kind, to your goal? (KSA 9, 11 
[212], p.525) 
This habitualization occurs in relation to thought too, for example, a “habitualization to a 
certain causal interpretation which in truth obstructs and even prohibits an investigation of 
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the cause” (TI, Four Errors,” 4). In political terms, it is these ingrained habits which 
Nietzsche’s rethinking of the physiological serves to disperse. Material forces do not simply 
influence thought; ideas materialize as physical effects. It is through the forces of habit that a 
particular kind of human comes to be. 
Notebook M III 1 in which these reflections on habitualization occur is a text replete 
with reflections on time and the body, particularly in relation to the thought of the eternal 
return – the momentous “revelation” of this period (Autumn 1881). It is also a surprising, 
lesser-known locus for the doctrine of the nearest things; in fact the two doctrines seem to be 
subtly related. In M III 1 Nietzsche integrates the idea that ideas are material forces into a 
draft for the most well-known section of The Gay Science: the moment in which the idea of 
the eternal return is first announced by a “demon”. To the anticipated question “But if 
everything is necessary, how can I be in charge of my own actions?” Nietzsche gives the 
following response: “You say that food, place, air, society shape and determine you? Well, 
your opinions do still more for these determine you to this food, place, air, society” (KSA 9, 
11 [143], p. 496).  It is your habits that isolate precisely these things as determinants. Formed 
within a “culture”, like cells in solution, perceptions and beliefs have a shaping power on 
how the nearest things are experienced. For Nietzsche, everything hinges on being able to 
make the eternal return such a determining power: “if you incorporate [einverleibst] the 
thought of thoughts it will change you”: “you” will come to embody the thought, or rather, 
the eternal return will embody you. It will become a new habit of thought.   
When Nietzsche crafts the famous section 341 of The Gay Science, “The Greatest 
Heavyweight,” these more explicit references to the nearest things fall away. Nevertheless, an 
echo can still be heard in the words “everything unspeakably small and great in your life must 
return to you” (my emphasis). In notebook M III 1 in an extended note entitled “the eternal 
return of the same” Nietzsche identifies the thought as a new point of gravity and 
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acknowledges “the infinite importance of our knowledge, our errors, our habits and ways of 
life for all that is to come” (KSA 9, 11 [141], p. 494). In the absence of eternal truth, the 
smallest things hold infinite significance for all that the human being can become. Nietzsche 
questions what we will do with the remainder of our lives, having lived for the greatest part in 
essential unknowing. He declares that “We shall teach the teaching”; this will prove the 
strongest means of “incorporating” it (Ibid.).   
 As Vanessa Lemm has remarked, “In order to consider philosophy as a form of life 
(bios theoretikos) and not merely as a doctrine or a science, the question of how truth can be 
lived or materialized in the physical body is obviously crucial.”xxxiv Lemm argues that 
Nietzsche envisages the philosopher of the free spirit as one for whom discourse on truth and 
life are no longer understood as separate things: “truth is no longer the object of a doctrine or 
a science, but of a form of life in which thought and life (zoe) must be considered in their 
unity”. xxxv The problem is that to embody truth means to incorporate life-preserving errors 
which are also immanent to the whole. Perhaps the most persistent life-preserving error is the 
Platonic-Christian thanatological addiction to nouns. It requires huge effort to think concepts 
like eternity or infinity as a plurality of forces because we habitually perform the reverse 
alchemy of considering these concepts as things, then “a” thing, then “the one”. It is only a 
physiology transformed by the thought of eternal return that can incorporate this thought. We 
recall the demon’s words to Zarathustra that if the thought possesses you it will change you 
as you are. To think otherwise we have to go to the “root” of our habits as this note from 
Notebook M III 1 intimates: 
How can one give meaning to the nearest smallest most fleeting things? A) By grasping 
them as the root [Wurzel] of habits. B) By grasping them as eternal and as likewise 
conditioning the eternal. (KSA, 9, 11 [167], p.506) 
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Eternity is almost universally figured as unconditioned and unconditional but such a sterile 
conception excludes everything that becomes. The idea that eternity might be born from these 
despised nearest things, that eternity might be created, constantly recreated and conditioned 
by these lowly things, is a world changing idea. As Graham Parkes has shown, “Nietzsche’s 
works are full of suggestions concerning how to realize our participation in the vegetal 
soul”.xxxvi Roots take hold and grow, things blossom into being, mature and decay (indeed, 
this is the priestly objection to them). Eternity at every moment is something which is formed 
by difference, by the ongoing interplay of forces productive of all becoming. As such, the 
nearest things are gateways of the moment, the means by which one becomes “what” one is. 
As Nietzsche comments in a note collected in The Will to Power: “We have discovered the 
“smallest world” as that which is decisive everywhere” (KSA 13, 14 [37], p. 236). 
To think the nearest things requires a liberation of the body from its exile by morality, 
it requires a physiology transfigured by eternal return. For Nietzsche, “every individual 
physiology, every life form, is merely the expression, continuation and instantiation of the 
entirety of forces” that is “life”.xxxvii: “In the actual world, in which everything is bound to 
and conditioned by everything else, to condemn and think away anything means to condemn 
and think away everything” (KSA 13, 14 [153], p.337). Produced by innumerable processes – 
biological, social, meteorological – the human animal is a holding pattern of on-going, 
eternally renewing forces. It is in this sense that the nearest things are the fundamental 
concerns of life itself (EH, “Clever,” 10). To attend to the smallest things, it is imperative to 
resist much, to withdraw from the cultural norms of reasoning and perceiving that have been 
hitherto incorporated. In surrendering habits of all kinds, either through sickness or through 
experiments with health, it is possible to access new sensuous continents of experience, to 
(eternally) return to things anew. 
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We recall the shadow’s words to the wanderer: “Of all that you have said nothing has 
pleased me more than a promise you have made: You want again to become a good 
neighbour to the things nearest to you. This will benefit us poor shadows too” (my emphasis). 
Taking “a step further in convalescence,” the “free spirit” in Nietzsche’s 1886 Preface to 
Human all too Human, professes gratitude for his expeditions: “He looks thankfully back, 
grateful to his wandering, to his hardness and self-alienation” in the icy heights (HH Preface, 
5). Slowly returning to health, he is full of wonder: “Where had he been? These near and 
nearest things: how changed they seem! What bloom and magic they have acquired in the 
meantime!  [..] He had been beside himself [ausser sich] no doubt of that” (ibid.). Beyond the 
citadel of the self, Nietzsche had returned anew to the nethermost and the close. In the 
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i Nietzsche’s works will be cited by aphorism or section number, following the abbreviation.  
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ii Gregory Moore, “Nietzsche, Medicine and Meteorology,” p.71. 
iii Adrian del Caro, Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of the Earth, p.216. 
iv Ibid. 
v Robert Miner, Nietzsche and Montaigne, p.158. 
vi Julian Young, Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography, p.282. 
vii Adrian del Caro, loc. cit. p.108. Emphasizing the importance of the “earth” in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, del Caro pays particular attention to these early sections of The Wanderer and his 
Shadow. Interestingly he omits the bizarre “long eggs” example but goes on to list the others, which 
with the exception of the claim that fragrances are stronger in cold air, relate to matters of eating and 
digestion. 
viii Babette E. Babich, “Nietzsche’s Imperative as a Friend’s Encomium,” p.39. 
ix Peter Heller in his extensive elaboration of this section and the first thirty-four sections of Part One 
of Human All Too Human, argues that Nietzsche’s “naturalism” commits him to a fundamental 
Heracleitean ontology to which he “remains true” (Von den ersten und letzten Dingen, p.5 ff.). It is 
beyond the scope of this present paper to engage in detail with Nietzsche’s putative naturalism (which 
has been treated extensively elsewhere). However, as we shall see in what follows, Nietzsche’s 
thinking of materiality is to be approached in terms of our earthly, bodily becoming. 
x Tracy B. Strong, “The Optics of Science, Art and Life,” p.20. 
xi Eric Blondel, The Body and Culture, p.126. 
xii Ibid. 
xiii Strong writes: “The danger is that we take our experience of the knowledge we have and conclude 
that this and this alone is the truth. If what we mean by nature is what is known, and known in 
multiple ways, then there is no naturalism, for there is no given nature” (Strong, loc. cit. p.28). 
xiv Jane Bennett cites Jacques Rancière’s claim that politics consists in contestation of “the given” 
(Vibrant Matter, p.123, n). Her work on the “active powers issuing from non-subjects” (p.ix) might be 
regarded as a contemporary attempt to think through the politics of the nearest things. However, it is 
puzzling that in her brief engagement with Nietzsche’s consideration of the material powers of things, 
she attributes to him a mechanistic model of physiology (p.45). 
xv Christa Davis Acampora, ‘Beholding Nietzsche’ p.368. 
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from the “petty politics” of the state to a “great politics” of the “earth. As Gary Shapiro writes, “A 
great politics of the earth certainly contrasts with a small politics, one focused on the petty and 
confused doings of states, national rivalries, and crude demagoguery such as the anti-Semitism 
[Nietzsche] came to despise’ (Nietzsche’s Earth, p.9). 
xvii John Gaskin, The Epicurean Philosophers, p.52 (“routine” is my addition). It should be noted that 
ἐγκύκλια has the connotation of 'going round in circles and getting stuck in them'.  It gets the (faint) 
connotation of “public education” from πολιτικὰ to which it is linked by καὶ (and). However, Long 
and Sedley, (1987) translate: “We must liberate ourselves from the prison of routine business and 
politics” (p.126). Aristotle and the orators, who are fairly close in date to Epicurus, use ἐγκύκλια for 
the kind of routine tasks that distract one from serious matters.   
xviii Christa Davis Acampora, “Beholding Nietzsche”, p.372. 
xix See Dawn 435 which plays on the maxim “Live unnoticed”. Here the passage entitled “Do not die 
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xxv Robert Gooding-Williams in Nietzsche’s Dionysian Modernism argues that “the distinctive style of 
a culture reflects a distinctive style of embodiment” (p.131). He goes on to say that “for Zarathustra, 
to listen to the body and the earth is to attune oneself to passions within one’s self and culture that one 
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xxx Graham Parkes. Composing the Soul, p.124. 
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xxxii “As he introduces his readers to his new way of life, he rehearses a number of familiar Epicurean 
themes: a formula for happiness modelled on Epicurean ataraxia; a strict determination of what one 
can and cannot control, including the eventual expiration of one’s mortal soul; a therapeutic 
attunement to the “little things” in life; an elaboration of the remedies that enabled him (and may 
enable others) to convalesce; an appreciation of the necessity of fate and of the benefits of loving fate; 
a dispensation of practical advice, often in the form of easily repeated maxims; and a renewed effort 
to discredit the odious teaching of personal (i.e., soul-based) immortality. Much like Epicurus, in fact, 
Nietzsche recommends his way of life by offering its this-worldly fruits—behold the man!—as the 
only proof that would be needed by the readers he hopes to attract” (“Why Nietzsche is a Destiny”, 
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xxxiii See “Beholding Nietzsche”, p.372. 
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